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DAMAGES-SOME SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE PLAINTIFF IS
NOT REQUIRED TO MINIMIZE DAMAGES
Is one who has been harmed, by an intentional, or positive and
continuing tort, or a nuisance, under a duty to use reasonable care
to avoid the consequences and reduce the liability of the wrongdoer 9
Generally speaking, when one is injured by the wrongful or
negligent act of another, whether as the result of a breach of contract, or as the result of a tort, such person is bound to exercise
reasonable care and diligence to avoid the loss or to minimize or
lessen the resulting damage. If he fails to exercise such reasonable
care and diligence, he can not recover for the unreasonable en1
hancement of damages.
The nature and extent of this duty requires that the injured
party use only such care and diligence as the ordinary prudent man
would use under the circumstances. He need not commit a wrong4
ful or criminal act, nor trespass, nor break his contract with a
third person, nor sell property over which he has no control,' nor
incur large expense.'
The problem of wilful injury is not so well settled that one
may reach a definite conclusion, as to the duty of the wronged
person to use reasonable care to avoid the consequences of the defendant's wrongful act. However there are some cases which have
held that the plaintiff need not minimize damages where the
wrong was intentional or a continuous tort or a nuisance? Mr.
McCormick in his book on damages states that the courts reached
this result because the undertaking on the part of the plaintiff, to
avoid the consequences would have placed an unreasonable burden
on the plaintiff." For this reason McCormick believes that the
'Kern v Friedrich, 220 Ala. 581, 126 So. 857 (1930), Louisville
and N. R. Co. v Cooper, 164 Ky 489, 175 S.W 1034 (1915) Hall v
Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N. E. 153 (1916), De Carli v O'Brien, 150
Ore. 35, 41 P 2d. 411 (1935) MCCORMiCK, DAMAGES (1935) 127.
Ha]!
'Lexington v Chenault, 151 Ky 774, 152 S.W 939 (1913)
v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N.E. 153 (1916).
'Wabash R. Co. v Campbell, 219 Ill. 312, 76 N. E. 346 (1905).
4
Wolf v St. Louis Independent Water Co., 15 Cal. 319 (1860)
5Des Arc Oil Mill v Western Union Telegraph Co., 132 Ark. 335,
201 S.W 273 (1918)
'Spicer v HincKs, 113 Conn. 356, 155 Atl. 508 (1931)
Paragould v Arkansas Light and Power Co., 171 Ark. 86, 284
S.W 529 (1926).
'Heaney v Heeney 2 Den. 625 (N. Y. 1846)
'Johnston v City of Galva, 316 Ill. 598, 147 N. E. 453 (1925).
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courts invoked the rule that the duty of avoiding the consequences
does not apply to nuisances and continuing torts.
it is submitted that had the court been seeking merely a desirable result, it could have relied upon the general rule set out
earlier, that one is not required to make a large outlay of capital,
or do any act which an ordinarily prudent person would not do
under the circumstances. Applying this rule, the plaintiff would
not have been required to make the expenditure and the defendant
would have been liable for the full amount of the damages
suffered.
In an early New York case it appeared that the plaintiffs tied
their boat to the defendant's wharf. The defendant cut the boat
loose and allowed it to drift out to sea. The plaintiff shortly afterward came upon the scene and saw his boat adrift. With small expense and due diligence the plaintiff could have retrieved the boat
but he failed to do so. The boat was washed against the shores of
Staten Island and rendered nearly worthless. It was held that "The
injury complained of was voluntary, and if wrongful, the plaintiffs
are under no obligation legal or moral, to take any steps to miti"1u
gate the consequences
In an Illinois case the facts showed that the city of Galva,
Illinois, was emptying refuse into a stream which flowed by the
plaintiff's farm. The plaintiff's cattle upon drinking water from
the stream became ill. The plaintiff sued the city of Galva for the
injury to his livestock. The city alleged by way of defense that the
plaintiff failed to take measures to minimize his damages, by constructing a fence along the stream. It was stated that no duty rested
upon the plaintiff to enclose the stream, as the rule which requires the injured party to protect himself from the consequences
of the defendant's wrongful act by the exercise of ordinary care,
effort, and expense on his part, does not apply in cases of
nuisance."
In a recent Washington case the defendant was engaged in
hydraulic mining and the waste from washing was allowed to flow
upon the land of the plaintiff for a period of about one year. The
defendant alleged that the plaintiff failed to take measures to minimize his damages. The court said,
"While we do not think the above contention is
strictly true, for the reason that as to the crops there
is testimony to the effect that there was nothing respondents could do to save their crops, and as to the
damage-to the freehold there is testimony that they
tried to keep the water away from their house but
were unable to do so, but be that as it may and ad"Heaney v. Heeney, 2 Den. 625, 627 (N. Y. 1846).
"Johnston v. City of Galva, 316 m. 598, 147 N. E. 453 (1925).
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mitting for the sake of this contention of appellant
that respondents might have made more of an effort
than they did to protect both their crops and house,
the requirement of minimizing damages does not
apply to cases of nuisances or in cases of intentional or
continuing torts. There is sufficient evidence in this
record to show that the tortious acts of appellant continued from the early spring of 1942 until the first
trial in the spring of 1943. This being true, it was not
necessary for respondents, in order to recover in this
action to show that they had made a reasonable effort
to minimize the damages.""
In an interesting case involving a suit against a labor union,
the plaintiff, a union member was wrongfully and without trial or
assessment of penalty fined and suspended from membership. He
brought an action against the labor union for damages sustained as
the result of his inability to find employment without union membership. The labor union as a defense alleged that the plaintiff
should have paid the fine wrongfully assessed against hun and
thus cut down liability of the union. The court after setting out the
general rule as to the duty on the part of the plaintiff to minimize
damages, decided that it was not applicable in this case and it
substantiated its position by quoting from a previous case which
asked the following question:
"But does this rule apply to the case of wilful injury' We are of opinion that it does not. Since one
who has committed an assault and battery upon
another can not urge in his defense that the plaintiff
might by the use of due care have avoided the battery, we think where the injury is intentional he
should not be permitted to say, in reduction of the
damage, that the plaintiff might have prevented them,
at least in part, by careful conduct on his part.""
The question of avoidable consequences has also arisen in the
relation of landlord and tenant when the tenant abandons the
leased premises before the end of the term of the lease and declines
to pay any more rent. The question then arises as to the duty of
the landlord to re-enter the abandoned property and try to rent it
to another tenant and to avoid so far as he can the consequences
of the breach of the tenant's contract.
In Abraham v. Gheens," a Kentucky case, the tenant held over
for four months beyond the period of the lease. By statute, if a
tenant holds over for more than three months, the term is extended
for an additional year, and both the tenant and the landlord are
"Desimone v. Mutual Materials Co. -Wash.-,
162 P 2d. 808,
812 (1945)
'Smith v
International Printing Pressman and Assistant's
Union of North America, -Tex.190 S.W 2d 769, 775 (1945).
205 Ky 289, 265 S.W 778 (1924)
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bound."0 The tenant abandoned the premises at the end of the four
months, and at the end of the term the landlord brought suit for the
eight months rent winch was unpaid. From a peremptory mstruction of a verdict for the landlord, the tenant appealed. The appellant
contended that after he vacated the premises, appellee should have
used diligence in procuring another tenant. He alleged further that
the trial court was in error in not allowing him to plead the defendant's failure to do so in his amended answer. In denying the
appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals said: "To this we can not
agree
no legal duty devolved upon appellee to supply a tenant
for the premises vacated by the appellant." '
It is believed that where the wrong committed by the defendant
consisted of an intentional, or a continuing tort, or a nuisance, and
in some situations a breach of contract, there is no duty placed
upon the plaintiff to use reasonable care to avoid the consequences
and thus minimize the liability of the defendant.
JAMES E. ADKINS

KY. R. S. (1946) 383.160.
"'Abraham v. Gheens, 205' Ky. 289, 293, 265 S.W 778, 780 (1924).
" Ibzd.

